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CONFERENCE REPORT:  
HANDLING ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN ARBITRATION AND 
JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Björn Arp* and Adam Briscoe** 
I. Introduction 
On February 18, 2019, the Center on International Commercial 
Arbitration1 (Arbitration Center) and the U.S. & International Anti-
Corruption Law Program2 (Anti-Corruption Program) co-
sponsored a panel titled ³Handling Allegations of Corruption in 
Arbitration and Judicial Dispute Resolution´ at American 
University Washington College of Law (AUWCL). It was the first 
time the Arbitration Center joined forces with the Anti-Corruption 
Program to provide expert analysis on the cross-cutting issue of 
corruption. Thanks to this cooperation, it was possible to bring 
together an interdisciplinary panel of expert practitioners, 
including a U.S. district court judge, academics, and arbitration 
practitioners to explore corruption issues in both international 
arbitration and domestic litigation and postulate the consequences 
that such issues can have across diverse legal fields, the economy, 
and government.  
AUWCL Professor Susan Franck opened the event by stating 
that the panel occurs at a time when the world is witnessing a sharp 
rise in nationalist sentiment and a ³resurgence´ in calls for the 
removal from international legal bodies. Franck acknowledged 
however, that at the same time, there are increased calls for active 
arbitral tribunals and judiciaries to parse out the issues in resolving 
disputes containing allegations of corruption. Examples Professor 
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Franck pointed out include the EU proposal for an investment 
court, calls for an international court of civil justice, and an 
international corruption court. Quoting a World Bank study that 
found corruption costs the world economy about $2 trillion per 
year,3 Professor Franck acknowledged that corruption still 
maintains a stronghold in international economics. Franck 
concluded that because of these ongoing developments, this 
panel¶s e[ploration of comple[ corruption issues that arise out of 
international economic law is both timely and relevant.  
Nancy Boswell, Director of the US and International Anti-
Corruption Law Certificate Program and Adjunct Professor at 
AUWCL, moderated the panel. In her introductory remarks, 
Boswell underlined the ³central importance´ of corruption as an 
issue that may arise in both arbitration and domestic court 
proceedings. She pointed out that corruption affects not only the 
business community, but also environmental and human rights 
protection efforts. 
Boswell continued by taking stock of where the international 
community currently finds itself in relation to handling allegations 
of corruption. She emphasized that achieving international 
consensus on issues of corruption remains a key challenge. 
Although there is still no universal definition for corruption, 
Boswell commented that international consensus has been reached 
on the fact that corruption is harmful, wrong, and an unacceptable 
cost to pay. She stated that consensus has also been reached in 
legal regimes, citing the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,4 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,5 and the UN 
 
3 To illustrate this point, the United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General António 
Guterres stated on the International Anti-Corruption Day on December 9, 2018, 
that the World Economic Forum estimates the global cost of corruption is at 
least $2.6 trillion, or 5 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP).  He 
further indicated that according to the World Bank, businesses and individuals 
pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every year. See Secretary-General's Message 
for 2018, available online at 
https://www.un.org/en/events/anticorruptionday/messages.shtml. 
4 Adopted on December 17, 1997, U.N.T.S. vol. 2802, I-49274. 
5 Adopted on March 29, 1996, OAS Series B-58.  
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Convention Against Corruption6 as prime examples. Although 
none of these conventions explicitly define corruption, Boswell 
noted that these conventions do enumerate criminal acts, which 
include active and passive bribery.  
Despite these hard-fought developments, Boswell made it clear 
that the anti-corruption field is a work in progress, highlighted by 
the significant cultural differences among nations with respect to 
corruption. She called attention to these differences when looking 
at some of the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA).7 While this legislation contains an exception for 
facilitation payments, such payments might be viewed as bribes in 
other countries or regions of the world. Additionally, while the 
FCPA prohibits giving gifts to foreign officials, this may be seen 
as customary in other cultures. Boswell concluded that these 
cultural differences and approaches to corruption are particularly 
important when such an allegation arises before a court or arbitral 
tribunal. 
II. Cross-Cutting Issues of Corruption in Judicial and Arbitral 
Dispute Settlement 
Lucinda Low, Partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP, began her 
remarks by putting the discussion about corruption into the context 
of the intersection between white-collar crime and international 
arbitration. In tracing the development of international standards 
and national laws on corruption, Low opined that the process 
began with the concept of criminalization. This process included 
the criminalization of various acts of corruption, provided 
infrastructure for cooperation among countries in corruption 
investigations, and established some limited preventative 
measures.  
Low then noted that criminalization prompted an increase in 
enforcement activities by national governments for those who have 
political will and capacity to investigate. She commented that 
multi-jurisdictional cases are increasing because multiple countries 
can have jurisdiction over the same criminal conduct, as long as 
 
6 Adopted on October 31, 2003, U.N. Doc. A/58/422; U.N.T.S., vol. 2349, p. 41. 
7 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. 
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the crime crossed national borders. This has led to a spillover 
effect, where some civil cases that included allegations of 
corruption have prompted criminal prosecutions under national 
law. Low highlighted this stage of development by the Aluminum 
Bahrain B.S.C. (Alba) v. Alcoa, Inc. case. In this case, Alba, an 
Alcoa customer, sued Alcoa in the United States claiming that the 
contracts they entered into were tainted by corruption and sought 
damages. The civil case led to a criminal prosecution and Alcoa 
ultimately paid substantial fines.8 
Low noted that in a majority of international disputes, 
arbitration is a more popular form of dispute resolution than 
litigation. In recent years, she commented that there has been a 
large increase in corruption allegations arising in both commercial 
and investor-state arbitration disputes. One case that will play out 
over the coming years and led to new developments in the 
prevention and sanctioning of corruption is the Brazilian 
Odebrecht case.   
Low explained that the corruption issue is typically asserted as 
a defense in arbitration. In commercial arbitration, it may be an 
agent suing for money under an agency contract and the 
respondent¶s defense is that the agent acted corruptl\, or that the 
contract was procured by corruption. In the investor-state context, 
Low noted that typically the state claims that the investment was 
either procured through corruption or performed in a corrupt 
manner. If the investment treaty requires that the investment be 
made in accordance with the local law, these state claims raise 
issues of jurisdiction. Otherwise, Low explained, the corruption 
defense raises issues of claim admissibility and the question for the 
tribunal to decide becomes whether corruption is a concept of 
international public policy. Low noted that sometimes the tribunal 
raises the issue of corruption by itself. The possibility of sua 
sponte action by the tribunal depends on the powers and duties of 
 
8 See Department of Justice Press Release, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture, 
January 9, 2014, available online at https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-
cases/sites/corruption-
cases/files/ALBA_Alcoa_US_DOJ_SEC_Settlement_PR_Jan_9_2014.pdf.  
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arbitrators. In fact, Low indicated that arbitrators may be at risk if 
the\ do not further investigate ³red flags´, or indicators of 
corruption.  
Low then discussed how issues of proof are central to dealing 
with corruption allegations in arbitration. When corruption 
allegations are raised in arbitration, and the home or host 
government has done no investigation, the tribunal is left to its own 
fact-finding resources. In these circumstances, Low commented 
that there are big debates among parties and institutions as to what 
the burden or standards of proof are to prove corruption. These are 
some unanswered and contentious questions that Low stressed are 
key for the legal community to work out in the coming years.  
When a tribunal reaches a finding of corruption, Low stated 
that the tribunal must determine the consequences of this 
wrongdoing. An example of the consequences for a finding of 
corruption may be the dismissal of the claim for lack of 
jurisdiction, even if the party performed under the contract, or the 
state received benefits under the contract. Low noted that the key 
case that dealt with findings of corruption is World Duty Free v. 
Kenya.9 In this investor-state case, a principal shareholder of the 
claimant submitted an affidavit admitting that he paid a bribe to the 
President of Kenya. The principal shareholder claimed that it was a 
customary payment for doing business in the country. The tribunal 
concluded that paying the bribe violated public policy and 
dismissed the claim. Strikingly, Low mentioned that the tribunal 
refused to attribute the conduct of the President of Kenya to the 
state, and as a result, Kenya got to keep benefits conferred under 
the contract by World Duty Free until that point in time. This 
decision was highly controversial and left arbitrators, practitioners, 
and academics wondering what the consequences should be in 
such cases. Low concluded her comments by highlighting that 
because states noZ perceive corruption defenses to be a ³get-out-
of-jail-free-card,´ states Zill lodge aggressive investigations into 
investor companies when there are legal disputes in order to build 
a corruption defense that can defeat an arbitration claim.  
 
9 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 
Award of October 4, 2006.  
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III. Corruption and the Judiciary 
The Honorable Judge Carlos Acosta, an Associate Justice at the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, began his 
discussion of corruption allegations before U.S. courts with a 
reference to a U.S. Senate Report which stated that when bribes are 
paid, contracts don¶t go to the most efficient producer but to the 
most corrupt. For these reasons, Judge Acosta stated that enforcing 
anti-corruption measures is sound public policy that also protects 
taxpayers. 
Discussing the history of the FCPA, Judge Acosta mentioned 
that some of the key reasons why this legislation was passed was 
due to cases of foreign bribery by Lockheed Martin and Chiquita. 
These cases gave rise to public uncertainty and dissatisfaction in 
the conduct of U.S. public companies doing business abroad, and 
ultimately led to the passage of the FCPA in 1977. Explaining the 
two central prongs of the FCPA, transparency of securities and 
bribery of foreign officials, Judge Acosta narrowed the scope of 
his comments to the latter. Judge Acosta pointed out that when 
looking at the regulation of bribery of foreign officials under the 
FCPA, the law does not ban facilitation payments, otherwise 
knoZn as ³greasing the Zheel´ pa\ments. He stressed that 
although the FCPA may not prohibit these forms of payments, 
national laws may, and so any U.S. business or individual doing 
business abroad should be very cognizant of the legal regime that 
they are working under.  
Delving into some major cases under the FCPA, Judge Acosta 
highlighted the 2008 Siemens AG case, which resulted in a $450 
million fine.10 He also noted the 2012 Marubeni Corporation 
FCPA violation, which resulted in a $54 million fine for acting as 
an agent for a joint venture in Nigeria, where the corporation paid 
$51 million in bribes to Nigerian officials.11 Judge Acosta noted 
 
10 See SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery, Press 
Release No. 2008-294, SEC Docket, (2008), available online at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.   
11 See Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal Penalty, Press 
Release No. 12-060, Dep¶t of Just. Docket (2012), available online at 
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that courts do not often hold formal trials in these cases. Instead, 
the suspect companies are offered deferred prosecution agreements 
in order to talk, pay a substantial fine, and ultimately avoid jail 
time. Reflecting on his time as a prosecutor, Judge Acosta stated 
that the difficulty in FCPA cases is proving the corrupt conduct or 
scheme.  
Turning to a major government procurement corruption case, 
Judge Acosta discussed the Fat Leonard scandal. This scandal 
involved Leonard Glen Francis, a Malaysian national, and his 
company Glen Defense Marine Asia, which supplied U.S. Navy 
ships with rations, supplies, and services when they came into 
ports across the Pacific Rim region. In order to win these resupply 
contracts, Francis bribed high-ranking members of the U.S. Navy 
with vacations, shows, prostitutes, cigars, and cash payments.  
More than 550 members of the U.S. Navy were investigated in this 
scandal, 33 of whom were prosecuted.12 Judge Acosta alluded to 
how the Fat Leonard scandal and other cases in the federal 
procurement arena highlighted major areas of fraud in government 
procurement work.  These areas include violations of the Buy 
American Act, unmet labor standards, overbilling, double-billing, 
price gouging, counterfeit products, and kickback schemes.13  
Judge Acosta concluded that the U.S. government fortunately has 
the resources to investigate when there is a complaint of 
wrongdoing in the U.S., which ultimately leads to court 
proceedings and convictions under the U.S. anti-corruption legal 
regime.  
IV. Corruption Allegations in International Arbitration 
The third speaker, Aloysius (Louie) Llamzon, a Senior 
Associate in the International Arbitration group at King & 




12 See Craig Whitlock & Kevin Uhrmacher, Prostitutes, Vacations and Cash: 
The Navy OfficialV µFaW LeonaUd¶ Took DoZn, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 2018, 
available online at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/seducing-the-seventh-
fleet/.  
13 Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301±8303 (2012). 
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arbitrators and practitioners when corruption is alleged, or even 
when the issue of corruption is raised in international arbitration 
cases.  Llamzon traced some of the history of corruption in 
international arbitration and commented that it has been an issue in 
this field since the 1960s.  Despite this, the first landmark case that 
addressed corruption in international arbitration, World Duty Free 
Ltd. v. Kenya, was not concluded until 2006.14  
Llamzon discussed the differences between investment and 
commercial arbitration in relation to a finding of corruption and 
noted that the investor-state arbitration system was designed in part 
to minimize global corruption forces. However, Llamzon 
highlighted an interesting aspect of how this dynamic has unfolded 
over the years when he pointed out that states assert corruption 
defenses against investors for conduct in which public officials are 
equally complicit more than two-thirds of the time. Distinguishing 
commercial arbitration corruption cases, Llamzon noted that most 
of these cases arise out of ³contracts for corruption´ that take the 
form of agency agreements between a seller and an agent who 
helps to secure a contract for the seller by peddling insider 
influence. When the agency contract is not fully performed or 
upheld, these contracts are sent to arbitration. A second, less 
common type of commercial arbitration corruption case is the type 
of case where corruption taints the consent of a party. Llamzon 
noted that these cases are similar to common law cases of 
contractual fraud.   
Llamzon next questioned whether there are real differences 
between the consequences of investor-state and commercial 
arbitration corruption cases. He started by noting that corruption 
can be seen as an issue of jurisdiction, admissibility, or the merits 
in the investor-state context. However, Llamzon noted an 
interesting caveat related to state responsibility in investor-state 
corruption cases: in such cases, a finding of corrupt conduct by a 
public official, or even a head of state, is not attributed to the state 
 
14 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Rep. of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 
Agreement for the construction, maintenance, and operation of duty-free 
complexes at Nairobi and Mombasa International Airports (Oct. 4, 2006), 
available online at https://www.italaw.com/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.  
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 9 
itself. In the commercial context, on the other hand, Llamzon 
explained that the contract is usually voidable or void ab initio as a 
principle of public policy because such a case is examined through 
the lens of national law. Yet even in such circumstances where the 
contract is voidable or void ab initio, the seller may be able to 
obtain non-contractual remedies for the cost of the goods they sold 
or other minor costs they incurred. 
Llamzon concluded with a discussion on the impact of 
domestic proceedings connected to arbitral decisions in which he 
considered two distinct corruption situations.  In the first situation, 
which is similar to Siemens v. Argentina, an investor wins an 
award and later pleads guilty in a national investigation of corrupt 
conduct related to the same contract, after which the investor is 
obligated to withdraw their acceptance of the arbitration award.15  
In the second situation, which is similar to Niko Resources Ltd. v. 
Bangl. Petroleum Expl. & Prod. Co. Ltd., the arbitral tribunal takes 
a more nuanced view of corruption.  In this situation, the tribunal 
holds that even if an investor pleads guilty in national courts to 
engaging in corrupt conduct while securing a contract, the 
corruption must taint the investment itself through an element of 
causation for the guilty party to be forced to relinquish all claims to 
an arbitration award.16  If the opposing party cannot prove that 
causation connects the corrupt conduct to the investment, the 
arbitration can proceed.  
V. Proving Corruption: The Role of Financial Experts 
The final speaker of the panel, Boris Steffen, the Senior 
Managing Director of GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group, 
discussed the roles and responsibilities that financial experts have 
responding to corruption allegations and conducting relevant 
 
15 Siemens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Termination of a 
contract for Siemens to implement an immigration control, personal 
identification, and electoral information system, including national identity cards 
(Jan. 17, 2007), available online at 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0790.pdf.  
16 Niko Res. Ltd. v. Bangl. Petroleum Expl. & Prod. Co. Ltd., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/18, Gas purchase and sale agreement, available online at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f10
%2f18.  
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investigations.  Steffen first touched on the role of a financial 
expert in these cases, noting that financial experts must refute 
allegations of fraud by using their auditing and accounting skills to 
establish fact patterns and relationships. Steffen stated that there is 
a clear red line in the role of such experts, cautioning that it is 
outside of a financial e[pert¶s role²and potentially an ethical 
violation²to draw any conclusions regarding the existence of 
fraud. Such conclusions require legal interpretation, and therefore 
are outside of financial e[perts¶ realm of e[pertise.  
Steffen then examined the three methods that financial experts 
use to collect evidence. The first is data mining, whereby the 
experts electronically review large data sets comprised of emails, 
ledgers, and other documents to determine relationships between 
individuals and other pertinent facts about the case. Steffen 
explained that the second method of evidence collection is an 
analysis of financial statements, which financial experts use to 
highlight unexpected or unanticipated financial relationships 
between assets and liabilities, sales forecasts, and costs.  The third 
method of collecting evidence is by refining the scope of the 
investigation.  Steffen noted the equal importance of interviews 
when conducting such investigations and stated that strategic 
interview methodology begins with interviews of third parties who 
could have pertinent knowledge regarding the facts at issue. After 
financial experts complete the third-party interviews, they 
interview any suspected parties followed by direct actors in the 
dispute.   
Steffen explained that financial experts typically disclose 
³badges of fraud´ or ³red flags´ that are indicative of fraud Zhen 
reporting or testifying regarding the investigation. Examples of 
such red flags include unsupported expense reimbursements for 
charges that occurred around the time that a contract was awarded, 
or contracts that were awarded to a consultant whose expertise was 
not consistent with the contract requirements. 
Steffen then listed the three methodologies that financial 
experts use when attempting to trace or recover assets, which 
include turning an inside witness, executing a covert sting 
operation, or conducting an asset-tracing operation using auditing 
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methods. Steffen explained that, depending on whether the 
corruption scheme is classified as an illicit (on-book) or 
undisclosed (off-book) scheme, some of these methodologies may 
be preferred over others. 
Steffen ended by commenting on the difference between 
conducting an investigation in an arbitration setting or in a judicial 
proceeding.  In arbitration cases where an interested individual or 
entity is not party to the arbitration agreement, financial experts 
may have to deal with issues that arise regarding safeguarding 
assets and proving claims. Such issues may require a party to use 
only information within their possession to prove a claim if a 
tribunal views an investigation into evidence of alleged corrupt 
conduct to be outside the scope of the underlying arbitral dispute.  
In order to safeguard assets, the interested party may have to go 
outside four corners of the arbitral proceedings and request that a 
national court freeze the assets. This could alert the opposing party 
to the corruption allegation and lead to the sale or disposition of 
the relevant assets. 
VI. Conclusions 
Nancy Boswell concluded the panel by noting that there is 
currently some consensus on the harm that corruption causes, the 
need to do something about it, and the relevant legal framework.  
However, Boswell stated that we are still in the early stages of 
standardizing the enforcement mechanisms of corruption actions, 
both in national courts and in international arbitral tribunals. For 
these reasons, Boswell noted that it is crucial to continue 
discussing corruption in international arbitration.  In time, this will 
allow us to work out the modern issues that practitioners face 
while also bringing new ideas to the table regarding how to 
generate more widely accepted anti-corruption practices 
throughout the legal profession. 
 
 
 
